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International Mediation and Capitulation to
the Routine
Leo F. Smyth*
I.

Introduction

International mediation differs from mediation in other contexts,
such as civil or family mediation, in that it involves a smaller number of
disputes that typically take a longer time to resolve. Furthermore, it is
practiced by a variety of mediators, from individuals to nation states, and
with a variety of methods, from communication-facilitation strategies to
much more highly directive ones.' In thinking about capitulation to the
routine in international disputes, we are not usually dealing with
problems that derive from a high case load or how the mediation service
is financed; nonetheless, the same concerns that gave rise to the
Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law Dispute
Resolution Symposium ("Symposium")2 -of threats to the high ideals of

the profession over time--can also be discerned in the international
sphere, and, being discerned, can become grounds for reflection on the
part of practitioners and scholars.
In the discussions that took place at the Symposium, the
international disputes that most concerned participants were those
springing from intergroup conflict, usually of an ethnic, racial, or
religious kind. In addition, due to the ongoing war with Iraq, there were
concerns about the nature of mediation, diplomacy, and the use of
military power. The discussions raised a number of troubling questions:
Can the mediator deal with intercommunal tension without addressing
the structures of the society in which it takes place? In what sense is the
* Adjunct Professor of Management, National University of Ireland, Galway;
Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution, University of MissouriColumbia; leo.smyth@nuigalway.ie.
1. Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation:
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).

2. See Symposium, Dispute Resolution and Capitulationto the Routine: Is There a
Way Out?, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 1 (2003).
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mediator neutral? Is taking responsibility for a fair "process" enough
when dealing with abuses of democracy or human rights? What is the
difference between mediation and diplomacy? What of the so-called
"power mediation" in which "process" goes hand in hand with pressure?
In what circumstances does armed coercion become a conflict-resolving
intervention for the mediator? Lastly, prompted by the nearness of
Gettysburg,3 such a strong symbol of the Civil War, the question was
raised whether the dynamic of perceived irreconcilable conflict leading
to secession is still being played out today in many parts of the world.
These are troublesome questions partly because of the emotions
they arouse and partly because they raise difficult questions of theory.
They touch on some defining characteristics of mediation, and it would
be presumptuous to expect to answer them completely in a paper such as
this. However, if we are to make progress in debating the challenges
facing international mediation, some attempt must be made to think
systematically about these questions, and this was my assignment.4
The starting point for this essay is the idea that how we understand
the origin of conflict shapes our idea of the role of mediators, and
therefore of their professionalism and responsibilities. Put simply, do we
make the assumption that intergroup conflict emanates from objective
conditions in society or from the thinking of the participants? Much of
the time we think of conflict as being caused by an interaction between
the two. For the purpose of developing an analytical framework,
however, this paper separates them into two distinct categories, drawing
on earlier attempts in the social sciences to shed light on troublesome
issues of debate.5 Add to this a related dimension: the mediator's
assumptions about the appropriate methods (and their timing) for
ameliorating the conflict; broadly speaking, this boils down to a choice
between influence attempts designed to produce internal changes in the
psychology of the contending parties (their perceptions, emotions,
cognitions, and perhaps moral choices) and influence attempts based on
external pressure (e.g., threats and promises) designed to produce
behavioral changes in the parties' negotiating stance (shifts in bargaining
positions, creative search for new options, etc.) Again, many mediators
will see their efforts as focusing on both of these goals (although
occasionally alternating between them). Here we will treat these as two
distinct sets of processes and place them against the previous dimension
3. The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law is located in
Carlisle, Pennsylvania and is approximately twenty minutes from Gettysburg.
4. 1 am grateful to Chris Honeyman and Leopoldo Artiles for their comments on a
previous draft of this paper.
5. GIBSON BURRELL & GARETH
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1979).

MORGAN,

SOCIOLOGICAL

PARADIGMS

AND

2003]

INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION AND CAPITULATION TO THE ROUTINE

237

of "perceived origin of conflict" to form a quadrant in which we can try
and locate various kinds of mediation efforts. The hope is that the
resulting analytical framework will produce more clarity for dealing with
the troublesome questions outlined above and for thinking about the
challenges facing international mediation. But first let us take a closer
look at the dimensions of the proposed framework.
II.

Our Theory of the Origin of Conflict: The Subjective-Objective
Divide

Burrell and Morgan proposed examining sociological theories in
terms of where they lay on a subjective-objective divide; that is, the
assumptions made by the social scientist concerning the very essence of
the subject matter they investigate:
Social scientists, for example, are faced with a basic ontological
question: whether the "reality" to be investigated is external to the
individual-imposing itself on individual consciousness from
without--or the product of individual consciousness; whether
"reality" is of an objective nature, or the product of individual
cognition; whether "reality"6 is a given "out there" in the world, or the
product of one's own mind.
Every mediator, of course, continually deals with this problem in
practice. To what extent is the client relating the "objective" truth or
how far is it colored by the bounded rationality of the human condition?
To what extent is the client's own understanding of "truth" affected by
perception, attribution, mental models, frames, sense-making,
interpretive schemas, or simple bias? On the other hand, mediators
sometimes wonder how much of the subjective experience of their clients
is the result of "objective" conditions in their lives: for example,
institutionalized social inequality, economic hardship, or political
repression. What conditions of injustice might exist which would lead a
client to describe his situation in the either-or formula, "Live Free or
Die?"
This basic issue touches a nerve in our understanding of law,
responsibility, and social conflict, and few debates in these fields can
venture far without running into it. For the present purpose (of reflecting
6. Id. at 1. Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan are two contemporary British
sociologists who in 1979 noted that theories in their discipline could be classified on two
dimensions: whether the theory took a subjective or an objective stance in relation to
sociological phenomena, and whether it emphasized social order and regulation or radical
social change. Id. Putting these two dimensions together in a 2 X 2 table Burrell and
Morgan were able to nominate four paradigms: Functionalist, Interpretative, Radical
Structuralist, and Radical Humanist. Id. Within one or other of these paradigms
sociological theories can be located. Id.
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on some troubling questions that touch on whether international
mediation is, in some sense, capitulating to forces that challenge its
ideals) we will assume that mediators handle each case with some idea in
mind of the extent to which the conflict derives from subjective
psychologicalstates or objective surroundingconditions. In passing, we
may note that the mediator's perception of this may not, and often will
not, coincide with the views of the contending parties.
III.

Our Choice of the Kind of Influence Attempt that Will Ameliorate
the Conflict

Mediation can be thought of as a series of influence attempts. Many
mediators, concerned with maintaining a stance of neutrality, might react
to this description, but it is hard to explain how the client changes in the
presence of the mediator if it is not through some process of influence,
however subtle. Having said that, there is a considerable range in the
degree of influence, from simple non-directive listening to a client telling
her story, through probing for clarification and refraining, to a much
more assertive confronting of the client with the starkness of the options
they face, as a prelude to seeking concessions. Further on, there are
directive influence attempts based on inducements, concessions, threats,
and sanctions. For the purpose of this analytical framework, a distinction
is drawn between influence attempts that the mediator believes will bring
about changes in the client's internal psychology (their perceptions,
attitudes, etc.) and attempts designed to change the client's behavior,
especially their negotiating stance, through external pressure. It is not a
particularly watertight distinction and certainly allows scope for
arguments that behavioral change emanates from prior personal
transformation in people's psychology, or, the opposite, that a change in
their behavior may produce sufficient dissonance to bring about a change
in attitude.8 Despite this, we will adopt the distinction so as to illustrate
the underpinnings of many approaches to international conflict
management.
IV. A Framework for Thinking About Various Kinds of Influence
Attempts in the Context of International Conflict
The table below shows examples of influence attempts arranged by
reference to the two dimensions of "Conflict assumed to be caused by
7. Some authors are quite explicit on this point. See, e.g., Bercovitch & Houston,
supra note 1, at 16. "The relationship between mediators and the disputing parties is
reciprocal. Those involved in a dispute wish to influence the mediator and the mediator
certainly hopes to influence the parties." Id.
8.
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
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Subjective states/Objective conditions" and "Conflict assumed to be
9
ameliorated through Internal Psychological Change/External Pressure."
We will examine each of the cells in the quadrant in turn to see what
kind of mediation or other influence attempt would be located there.

Mediator judges
conflict can be
ameliorated by
bringing about
internal
psychological
changes in the parties
Mediator judges
conflict can be
ameliorated by
bringing external
pressure to bear on
the parties to change
their behavior

A.

Conflict seen by
mediator as deriving
from Subjective states

Conflict seen by
mediator as deriving
from Objective
conditions

I
Listening
Reflecting
Clarifying
Questioning
Confronting

II
Education
Workshops
TRC
Frame Reflection

III
"Hearts and minds"
Attitudinal structuring
Negotiation of
symbols
Assessment of risk
and cost
Indoctrination
Brain-washing

IV
Creating value
Integrative
bargaining
Double designing
Distributive
bargaining
Power mediation
Coercion
"Unconditional
surrender"

Cell I

In the upper, left cell (Cell I), we see influence attempts based on
the assumption that the conflict largely derives from subjective states of
the parties and can be ameliorated through internal psychological
changes.10 At one extreme, this is the domain of Rogerian non-directive
counseling, where listening and reflecting back of client feelings is a
powerful intervention in itself. The sheer power of being heard can have
9. The table is a framework for locating influence attempts in international
mediation.
10. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
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the effect of parties coming to adopt new perceptions of the situation,
perhaps less egocentric understandings of themselves, perhaps even new
appreciations of other parties," less colored by projection and attribution.
This domain is of immense significance in clearing the decks before
proceeding to more substantive bargaining.
Insofar as there are
blockages to effective listening and communication deriving from the
bounded rationality of skewed perception, faulty cognition, or personal
emotional reaction, it is clearly helpful to deal with these, so that
distinctions such as those between "positions" and "interests" can be
addressed. 12
Not all influence attempts in this cell are non-directive. Within the
limits of the assumption that amelioration will come from internal
psychological changes without "pressure," there may be some
questioning by the mediator in order to elicit greater clarity on the part of
the client. Similarly, clients may be encouraged to reflect on their deeper
needs and long-term aspirations. However, there is a point at which
encouraging internal reflection gives way to pressure from outside, in
which case the influence is located in Cell III. 13 If we take by analogy
the field of psychiatry, influence attempts range all the way from nondirective counseling to aversion therapy; in the context of conflict
management, there is a similar point at which the counseling approach
gives way to the more rough-and-tumble arena of negotiation, and
14
beyond that, to inducements and sanctions.
B.

Cell H

The upper, right cell (Cell II) contains influence attempts that are
again based on the assumption that the conflict can be improved by a
change in the subjective states of the parties. 15 This time, however, there
is a different view of the origin of the conflict; it derives from objective

11.
(1983).
12.

GEOFFREY VICKERS, THE ART OF JUDGEMENT: A STUDY OF POLICY MAKING
ROGER

J.

FISHER

&

WILLIAM

L.

URY,

GETTING

TO YES:

NEGOTIATING

AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); see Chris Provis, Interests vs. Positions: A
Critique of the Distinction, 12 NEGOT. J. 305 (1996).

13. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
14. For those who are deeply convinced of the correctness of what Burrell and
Morgan call the Interpretive Paradigm, Cell 1 will be the only valid one. See BURRELL &
MORGAN, supra note 5. For them, "social reality, insofar as it is recognized to have any
existence outside the consciousness of any single individual, is regarded as being little
more than a network of assumptions and intersubjectively shared meanings. The
ontological status of the social world is viewed as extremely questionable and
problematic .... IId. at 31.
15. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.

2003]

INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION AND CAPITULATION TO THE ROUTINE

241

conditions. 16 What efforts at mediation might be made in such a case?
One example is the idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
where real past injustices and acts of violence are explored and
acknowledged in the presence of both victims and perpetrators with a
view to healing the psychological wounds they have caused. Other
examples include the kind of third party consultation workshops where
the primary object is to bring about conditions in which objective
difficulties can later be discussed, accepting that a great deal of work will
be necessary on removing blockages to communication and building
trust before this can happen.1 7 The very practice of talking about
conflicts in a facilitated way, and often in a comparative context, installs
meta concepts for thinking about it and assessing its causes, as well as
providing the different parties with a common language for dialogue.
Drawing attention to the frames we use (sometimes unconsciously) in
our thinking and becoming aware that there are other possible frames in
existence' 8 is another intervention that might be included in this cell.
Encouraging the parties to jointly imagine their future is a way of
influencing them towards a more positive attitude in trying to bring that
future about.19 Ury's suggestion of "building a golden bridge for a party
to retreat over" 20 is also an influence process in this cell. At a more
general level, this is the domain of education, either experiential, as when
contending parties visit sites of environmental conflict together, or more
classroom-based, as when history teachers from opposing traditions get
together to plan a joint curriculum that will be less divisive than those
traditionally used. Although not strictly a mediation effort, Osgood's
proposal for gradual reduction of tension (a psychological outcome)
through unilateral confidence building initiatives in the objective domain
can also be thought of in terms of this cell. 2 '
In Cell II the expectations for immediate substantive change are

16. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
IN
NATIONS,
CONFLICT
IDENTITY-BASED
RESOLVING
ROTHMAN,
17. JAY
ORGANIZATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES (1997); Herbert Kelman, Creating Conditions for

Israeli-PalestinianNegotiations, 26 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 39, 75 (1982); Herbert Kelman,
Group Processes in the Resolution of International Conflicts: Experiences from the
Israeli-PalestinianCase, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 212 (1997); see Ronald J. Fisher, Third
Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution: A Review of Studies,
27 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 301 (1983).
18. Linda Putnam & Majia Holmer, Framing, Reframing, and Issue Development, in
COMMUNICATION AND NEGOTIATION (Linda Putnam & Michael E. Roloff eds., 1992); see
DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF
INTACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994).

19. Maire A. Dugan, Imaging the Future: A Tool for Conflict Resolution, in
PEACEBUILDING: A FIELD GUIDE (Luc Reychler & Thania Paffenholz eds., 2001).
20. WILLIAM L. URY, GETTING PAST No (1991).
21.

CHARLES OSGOOD, AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER (1962).
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modest; for without some pressure to overcome the pain of movement on
cherished values and aspirations, the improvements to the psychological
state of the parties have a somewhat preliminary tone. But this is not to
say that no change takes place. In addition to the undoubted utility of the
processes described above, parties may come to a state where they still
hold to their positions on objective matters ("I have not changed one bit
my pro-choice/pro-life views") but now respect the sincerity and
goodness of people who hold opposite views. The efforts of some
mediators/facilitators in the context of social controversies such as
abortion are directed towards just such an outcome; and, given the
intensity of the passions such controversies often arouse, perhaps it is not
such a modest outcome after all.22
C. Cell 111
In Cell III, disputes are again perceived as emanating principally
from the subjective states of the parties, but here they are seen as capable
of amelioration by some degree of external pressure coming from other
contending parties or from a mediator.23 This is the domain of assertive
persuasion, designed to shift parties' perceptions and cognitions, and
their associated affect. It is worth recalling that Walton and McKersie
cited "attitudinal structuring" as one of their four central aspects of
negotiation.
As distinct from making offers and counteroffers, the
communication of bargainers is frequently directed towards convincing
the other party that what they want is impossible or perhaps that they do
not really want it all that much. A similar idea is that the efficacy of
some mediation depends, in part, on parties' subjective assessments of
the risks and costs of the alternative-going to court. It is by no means
unusual for third party mediators to draw the attention of parties to risks
of this kind, as a forerunner to seeking concessions-again a use of
pressure to bring about changes in party attitudes.
Of particular interest in this cell is the question of symbols.
Sometimes what appear to be issues pertaining to objective conditions
turn out to be problematic largely because of the symbolism they
embody. Symbols are so powerful because they stand for much of what
we take to be our group identity-or its denial. Dealing with symbols
often involves developing more complex conceptions of group identity,
which is a psychological, more than an objective, shift. Of course it is
22.
23.

I am grateful to Sallyann Roth for this example.
See supra note 9 and accompanying table.

24.

RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF

LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965).

25.

See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
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often a moot point where "the objective" leaves off and the symbolic
takes over, but one can think of conflicts where the substantive issue, for
example, regional versus central government powers, has been settled
constitutionally but conflict continues over the flying of flags, use of
minority languages on road signs, singing of anthems,26 and even
wearing of rugby shirts.27 To say this is not to diminish the importance
of symbols or the role they play in aggravating-and potentially
healing-conflict. If these matters were addressed in a workshop format,
the influence attempt would be placed in Cell II; if, however, the
symbolism is addressed with some degree of pressure for change, then it
lies in Cell 111.28
Pressing people in negotiation mode to change their symbols is one
thing; using extreme pressure, such as indoctrination or brainwashing, is
another. Yet they too conform to the definitions of this cell (seeking

changes in subjective states through the application of external pressure),
although whether they could be held to be ameliorating the conflict is
certainly open to debate.
D. Cell IV
Disputes in Cell IV are seen to derive from objective conditions
where amelioration will come from external pressure. 29 There is a huge
variation in the way this pressure can be applied, roughly corresponding
to a scale of cooperation versus unilateralism. At the cooperative end of

26. Ireland has for decades fielded a single national rugby team to compete at an
international level, even though one part of the island, Northern Ireland, is
constitutionally part of the United Kingdom. It was not an entirely satisfactory solution
for some of the players from Northern Ireland, whose political aspirations might not have
been in favor of uniting with the country for whose anthem they stood to attention before
matches; however, it enabled a team to be fielded that could compete creditably at an
international level in a way that neither part of the island could manage on its own. By
the 1990s, awareness of the need for communal sensitivities had grown to the point
where it was felt appropriate to invent a second "national" anthem, more inclusive and
less political. Phil Coulter, who wrote the song, recounted his pride on first hearing it
sung at Lansdowne Road stadium in Dublin by thousands of fans who took it to their
hearts as one symbolic piece of a new attitude toward a centuries-old problem.
27. In the New South Africa of the 1990s, many felt that the emblem of national
sporting teams, the Springbok, was too heavily associated with the Apartheid regime, and
its all-white players, to be representative of the new "rainbow" country. On the other
hand, the Springbok symbol, with its proud tradition of world-class sport, was something
that could be shown respect in a way that transcended racial identities, a point recognized
by President Nelson Mandela when he walked on to the field at the start of the Rugby
World Cup final wearing a Springbok jersey and cap, to the delight of the mostly white
audience.
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
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the scale are the variants of integrative bargaining, 30 problem-solving
negotiation, search for joint gain, or the creation of value. 31 All of these
involve a degree of pressure for developing new negotiating stances, yet
they also involve a degree of cooperative search in doing so. The
pressure to achieve change is somewhat tempered by respect for the
constraints facing the other parties, perhaps even by some appreciation of
their aspirations. There is a sense of "we-ness" in the search that needs
to be protected from unduly unilateral insistence on particular outcomes.
Thus, Schon and Rein, writing in the context of policy controversies,
refer to "double designing," a process in which "substantive32 design
moves must not threaten the integrity of the designing coalition.,
Somewhere in the middle of the cooperative-unilateral scale is
distributive bargaining, based on a mix of inducements, concessions, and
possibly threats (e.g., of a trade boycott), with overstatement of goals,
bluff, and brinkmanship thrown in for good measure. Still, there is some
degree of cooperation involved, if only to the extent of joint acceptance
that there is a game in progress that takes place within tacitly accepted
rules. These rules may, for example, be that bluffing is acceptable but
falsifying documents is not. Where the pressures extend to threats of
violence, for example the Mafia tactic of making someone "an offer he
can't refuse ' 33 (i.e., threatening his life), distributive bargaining has slid
into unilateral coercion.
At the unilateral end of the scale in Cell IV, conflicts are seen as
capable of being resolved (perhaps "ended" would be a better word)
solely through sanctions, without reference to changing the
psychological state of the parties.34 This is the domain of realpolitik, of
the ultimatum, of power coming out of the barrel of a gun, of God being
always on the side of the big battalions. In practice, one may protest that
this is not a fair characterization of most negotiations (nor most attempts
at mediation), which very often attempt to "bring people along" with
some degree of voluntarism, to a "resolution" with which all parties can
live. There is some truth in this objection; nonetheless, it is worth
emphasizing the starkness of the extreme cases, particularly in the
context of international relations, for it touches on some of the troubling
questions raised in our debate. Is force the ultimate kind of mediation?
Or does that make nonsense of the concept?
30. DEAN G. PRUITT & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION,
SETTLEMENT, AND STALEMATE (1986).
31.
DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAINS (1986).

32.
33.

SCHON & REIN, supra note 18, at 168.
THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).

34. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
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The Troublesome Questions

The question now is: does the above framework help us in dealing
with the troublesome questions that emerged during the Symposium?
Before reviewing those questions let us note some previous attempts to
distinguish between different kinds of mediation efforts and how those
distinctions have been applied to form contingency approaches to the
field.
A.

ContingencyApproaches

These approaches relate the type of mediation effort (for example,
Cell II or Cell IV) to the circumstances of a conflict at a particular point
in time. 35 The key question is not whether one type of mediation effort is
better than another but which is appropriate in a particular case. With
these approaches a whole range of interventions can be brought to bear,
including those that address objective interests as well as personal
psychology, and with various degrees of pressure applied to the parties.
A number of scholars have distinguished between different kinds of
mediation efforts. Bercovitch and Houston identify three main strategies
of mediator behavior, ranging from low to high intervention. 36 These are
respectively: communication-facilitation,where a mediator takes a fairly
passive role; procedural,where a mediator takes more formal control
over the process; and directive strategies, where a mediator may issue
ultimatums and provide rewards and punishments.37 These distinctions
are clearly similar to some of those drawn in the table above and,
moreover, are presented with empirical data on their effectiveness in
resolving international disputes. 38 Thus the authors note that directive
strategies are most likely to be successful, especially "when disputes are
'39
intense.
This idea of "fit" or appropriateness to the circumstances has found
favor with other scholars who have taken it even further. Kriesberg
distinguishes four major stages of de-escalation (preparation, initiation,
negotiation, and implementation), making the point that the specific
content, form, and significance of mediating activities vary at different
stages. 40 Again, one might be able to locate such efforts in the four cells

35. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
36. Bercovitch & Houston, supra note 1.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
39. Bercovitch & Houston, supra note 1, at 30.
40. Louis Kriesberg, Timing and Initiationof De-Escalation Moves, 3 NEGOT. J. 375
(1987); see LOUIS KRIESBERG ET AL., INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR
TRANSFORMATION (1989).
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of the above table. 4' Fisher and Keashly have, over several years, refined
their efforts at clarifying the contingencies under which various types of
mediation will be most effective, most notably in clarifying the
complementary roles of third-party consultation (a preparatory effort),
which may enhance the chances of negotiation (dealing with interests)
being successful. 42 In addition, Keashly and Fisher have been explicit
about the subjective-objective divide:
A contingency approach to third-party intervention is based on the
assessment that social conflict involves a dynamic process in which
objective and subjective elements interact over time as the conflict
escalates and de-escalates. Depending on the objective-subjective
mix, different interventions will be appropriate at different stages of
the conflict. If objective elements linked to resource scarcity are
predominant at a given point, then third-party methods that facilitate
a compromise or provide a judgment are appropriate. If subjective
elements such as misperception, miscommunication, and the
differential valuing of objective interests are much in evidence, then
third-party activities that improve the relationship and induce
problem solving are indicated. In all cases, the beliefs held about the
nature of social conflict (that is, objective vs. subjective) by the
parties (and any third parties) will have an43 effect on perceptions
about what type of interventions are realistic.
Rothman, building on the insights of Azar 44 and RoSS, 45 evolved an
approach based on distinguishing four phases of third-party work,
dealing respectively with Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, and Action
("ARIA"). 46 In effect, one has to start with where people are (their
existing positional frames and associated affect) before they can be
helped to address substantive interests with creativity and action
planning. This approach is put forward not just on grounds of
effectiveness but also on the need to avoid making matters worse: "It is
ironic that negotiation can make conflicts worse. . . . In premature
41. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
42. Ronald J. Fisher & Loraleigh Keashly, Distinguishing Third Party Interventions
in Intergroup Conflict: Consultation Is Not Mediation, 4 NEGOT. J.381, 393 (1988);
Ronald J. Fisher & Loraleigh Keashly, The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and
Consultation with a Contingency Model of Third Party Consultation,28 J. PEACE RESOL.
29(1991).
43. Loraleigh Keashly & Ronald J. Fisher, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict
Interventions: Theoretical and PracticalConsiderations, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 240 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).
44. EDWARD E. AzAR, THE MANAGEMENT OF PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT:
THEORY AND CASES (1990).
45. MARC H. Ross, THE CULTURE OF CONFLICT: INTERPRETATIONS AND INTERESTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1993).
46. ROTHMAN, supra note 17, at 87.
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negotiations, disputants may try to do the impossible-forge a feeling of
mutuality out of hatred. A 7 This salutary warning can be linked to the
idea from research methodology of "necessary but not sufficient"
conditions in bringing about success. For example, negotiating conflicts
of interest (the sufficient condition) may be impossible until suspicion,
stereotypes, and miscommunication (the necessary condition) have been
Or, where ethnic violence is ongoing, peacekeeping
addressed.
intervention to stop the violence may be a necessary, although not
sufficient, condition for peace talks to be initiated.
Does this stream of work help us in debating the troublesome
question of whether the mediator can address intergroup tension without
dealing with the structures of the society in which it takes place? Can we
say it is simply a question of timing as to when best to address the
subjective and the objective? Or can mediators adopt the position: "I
take responsibility only for the fairness of the process-I have no views
on the substantive outcome of the dispute?"
B.

Can the Mediator Deal with Intergroup Tension Without Addressing
the Structures of the Society in Which They Occur?

This depends in the first instance on a judgment call about the
extent to which the conflict derives from subjective states rather than
objective conditions. To the extent that it is deemed to be subjectivefor example, largely about symbols-it may be amenable to the kinds of
influence or mediation attempts characteristic of Cells I and 11.48 One
thinks of the disputes about the flying of the Confederate flag on public
buildings in certain states, or about the different meanings of Columbus
Day for Italian-Americans and Native Americans. It could be that a style
of mediation found in Cell I is initially appropriate, establishing what the
meaning of the proposed celebration is in the hearts and minds of the
At some point, interventions
protagonists and their opponents. 49
characteristic of Cell II might be thought useful 50 -for example,
education on the reality of the Italian state in the time of Columbus (was
it a state at all?), Columbus's own concept of regional identity, and his
attitude toward his discoveries and the indigenous populations he
found.51 But while this could be a step on the road, it may be that sooner
or later, the job of the mediator is to pressure the parties to develop a
solution that takes account of the subjective states of others-a Cell III

47.

Id.

48.
49.
50.
51.

See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
I am grateful to Leopoldo Artiles for this example.
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type intervention.5 2
Still the question remains: what if there are "real" objective
conditions in the society that, in the mediator's view, are the source of
the conflict----conditions that deal, for example, with lack of access to
political power or unjust allocation of resources? Can these disputes be
ameliorated solely by bringing about internal psychological changes in
the participants?
Some mediators might answer "yes" on the grounds that no lasting
agreement can be forged without paying attention to the identity and
needs of the parties, which are the "real" source of the resource
53
allocation problem. Their efforts will clearly focus on Cells I and II.
For some authors this choice of interventions is partly based on the
conviction that the moral/motivational development of the parties is the
surest way forward.5 4 It is not that they deny the "reality" of objective
conditions (e.g., the idea of structural violence) but have a strong view of
what kind of process should be tried in order to bring about a more just
society. From this perspective they are adamant that responding to a
violent system according to its own rules simply perpetuates the cycle of
violence and is, moreover, unworthy of the best in humanity. Ikeda
expresses it eloquently:
The most important thing to learn from the experiences of the
twentieth century is this: whether the issue is racial, as in the case of
fascism, or class-related, as in the case of communism, attempting to
trace primary causes of evil to external factors invites tragedy and
slaughter. Transcending inner evil is both our most urgent duty for
the twenty-first
century and the essential goal of all reform
55
movements.
This is a clear statement of the primacy of mental/moral development in
dealing with conflict.
Other scholars and mediators are more skeptical, believing that a
willingness to address issues of fairness and resource allocation is what
produces the trust on which mutual respect of different identities is
based. In some cases, group identity is based not just on characteristics
people believe themselves to have but on the differences between
themselves and others, differences that may extend to economic or
52. See supranote 9 and accompanying table. Choosing what type of intervention to
make is part of the skill of the mediator. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin et al., The Tension
Between Empathy and Assertiveness, 12 NEGOT. J. 217 (1996).

53.

See supranote 9 and accompanying table.

54. JOSEPH P. FOLGER & ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1995).
55. JOHAN GALTUNG & DAISAKU IKEDA, CHOOSE PEACE: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN
JOHAN GALTUNG AND DAISAKU IKEDA (1995).
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political resources. MacDonald expresses it: "Important sections of the
superordinate group identify themselves with their superiority as
superiority and come to depend for their self-definition not only on what
they have, but on the discrepancy between what they have and what the
subordinate group lacks." 56 From such a perspective, structural change is
the reality of where the conflict is, and no amount of making people
appreciate each other will produce long term improvement in the absence
of changes in the way their interdependence is regulated.
These deep differences are rather more than a chicken-and-egg
debate among mediators as to whether starting in Cell I, II, III, or IV is
the best tactic. 57 There are underlying philosophies of the nature of
mankind and of society, a point addressed below. A pragmatic way out
of the difficulty could be a view, shared by mediators of different styles
and beliefs, that the process is not over until both structural and
relationship issues have been addressed, regardless of the order in which
that happens. With such a view, attention to "process," even where it
produced agreement, would not be regarded as good professional
practice unless it addressed both sets of issues. Rothman articulates a
similar viewpoint:
I firmly believe that only when identity concerns are surfaced through
the kind of analytical process promoted by the conflict resolution and
dialogue schools, and perhaps somewhat transformed as vehicles for
moral and general development, can they be "ripe" for interest-based
conflict management. On the other hand (distinct from some who
feel resolution, dialogue, or transformation are the end of the
process), I believe that at the later stage of conflict processing or
engagement, interest-based bargaining or conflict management has
much to offer by way of concretization and consolidation.
The problem of societal structures becomes more pointed when the
mediator feels affronted by the injustice meted out to one set of clients in
a dispute, or, in the more hard-headed perspective of international
relations, feels that her own interests are being threatened by it. Is it
possible to be "neutral" in such conditions?
C.

In What Sense Is the MediatorNeutral? Is Taking Responsibilityfor
"Process" Enough?
Again, it is useful to work from contrasts. For those who accord a
56.

Michael MacDonald, The Dominant Communities and the Costs of Legitimacv,

in THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE: SOuTH AFRICA, ISRAEL, NORTHERN IRELAND 36
(Herman Giliomee & Jannie Gagiano eds., 1990).
57. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
58. ROTHMAN, supra note 17, at 174-5.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1

great deal of influence to the "system" (of realist international relations,
impersonal economic forces, or whatever) conflict is to be expected in
society. Some form of pluralism is the best that can be hoped for, and in
the working out of these plural interests mediators are not neutral but
have interests of their own. Touval and Zartman go so far as to suggest
that a triangular relationship is created in international mediation,
enhancing the mediator's bargaining power because of his power to join
one party in a coalition against the other. 59 Having said that, they later
make the point:
By arguing that, as a rule, third parties need not be perceived as
impartial to be acceptable mediators, we do not wish to suggest that a
mediator can support one party to a dispute without risking the loss of
the other's cooperation. Mediators must constantly be on guard lest
their behavior create suspicions that detract from their effectiveness.
But, depending on the circumstances, they do have some latitude in
this regard. This latitude may go so far as to enable them6 to express
their preference regarding the outcome of the negotiation. 0
This would indicate that it is normal for international mediators to
be partial, but, tactically, care is needed in how the partiality is shown.
The game has its own rules but skillful players may be able to sail close
to the breeze. And, given that there are three sets of goals in the process,
the criteria for successful mediation will be correspondingly complex.
Studies of international mediation have frequently noted the role
played by "partial insiders," people who, while unquestionably belonging
to one side or the other, nonetheless play a significant role in facilitating
conflict-managing processes. It may be that this partiality towards
outcome, while retaining some ability to influence process, is more
normal in international relations than in other kinds of mediation.
Having said that, while nobody expects the mediator to be a "'Eunuch
from Mars,' distant and disinterested, indifferent to the conflict and
issues at hand,, 61 there are expectations that the role of mediator
precludes advocacy, at least for as long as the mediation is in session.
This seems to come from a view that the nature of mediation is
essentially connected to dialogue, and genuine dialogue is not compatible
with advocacy of a fixed position regarding the outcome.
But if there is a professional demand for even-handed attention to

59. 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & SAADIA TOUVAL, Conclusion: Mediation in Theory and
Practice,in INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1985).
60. Id. at 256.
61. Peter Camevale & Sharon Arad, Bias and Impartiality in International
Mediation, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
MEDIATION (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).
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process, there may also be occasions when the mediator must object to
an emerging outcome if something approaching a fundamental set of
values is threatened. This presupposes a set of values so close to the
very concept of mediation that the mediator has to take a stand and
What might these
possibly even withdraw from the process.
fundamental values be? Eyben suggests three: an acceptance of the
fundamental equality of people, an acceptance of diversity among them,
and an acceptance of interdependence between them.62 Without at least
some level of adherence to these values, the argument goes, the very idea
of mediation (at least of the kind that proceeds from respect for personal
change) is not possible. There is a suggestion in these values of some
universal rights of man that cannot be bargained away, even by
agreement. In this respect, therefore, the mediator is not neutral with
respect to the outcome. For example, where an agreement could be
reached by including provisions that a majority vote in the territory can
establish Sharia law (Islamic law derived from the Koran) to be binding
on all citizens regardless of faith, many mediators might feel this violated
the principle of respect for diversity.63
The problem of working with clients whose actions violate the
mediator's own sense of values is particularly acute in the case of
violence; how far should one go in talking with terrorists? 64 This issue is
very likely to come up in international or inter-ethnic conflicts because
many paramilitary groups alternate between what Walton, in a classic
paper, described as two strategies of social change: activities directed
towards changing the attitudes of the adversaries and those directed
65
In the
towards forcing the adversaries to change their behavior.
language of the framework developed here, their actions alternate
between Cell II, seeking attitude change through internal transformation
66
and dialogue, and the unilateral end of Cell IV, acts of violence. To put
it bluntly, the same people who are seeking dialogue today may be
planting bombs tomorrow. The mediator's dilemma is not made much
62. KARIN EYBEN ET AL., A WORTHWHILE VENTURE? PRACTICALLY INVESTING IN
EQUITY, DIVERSITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1997).
63. Even in practical questions of education and healthcare, reconciling conflicting
principles, for example, respect for religious differences with respect for the separation of
church and state, will never be easy: should the dress code in schools be allowed to
reflect particular religious preferences regarding head covering?; should certain medical
procedures, repugnant to, or advocated by, certain religions be offered in state hospitals?
64. It is hard nowadays to use this word without thinking of the atrocity of 9/11. It
may be necessary to remind ourselves from time to time that the meaning of the word is
problematic, as illustrated by the fact that many of the founding fathers of democratic
states were considered terrorists by the ruling authorities of their day.
65. Richard E. Walton, Two Strategies of Social Change and Their Dilemmas, I J.
APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 167, 179 (1965).
66. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
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easier by the frequent use of a "political" and a "military" wing, which
pursue the two strategies simultaneously. The question remains: how far
is it ethical to do deals with a group that is, albeit by proxy, holding a
gun to the head of another client group, and frequently demonstrating a
willingness to use it. On the other hand, without opening up lines of
communication, how can the conflict be moved from unilateral attempts
at coercion to some version of negotiation?
In many international
conflicts this is precisely the first task of mediation efforts and it is hard
to see how this can be accomplished without communication. Shifting
parties from the latter end of Cell IV to Cell II necessarily includes some
willingness on the part of the mediator to enter into the mental world of
the perpetrator of violence. 67 This may be a challenge to the mediator,
partly from the profoundly disturbing effect of allowing oneself to
understand the world in this way, partly from the vilification that may be
heaped on one for doing so. But terrorism also has its logic and
pretending that it is simply irrational does no service to our
understanding of it, nor our ability to reduce it.
If mediator neutrality poses problems, these problems are paralleled
by the problems of how far mediation is prepared to go in putting
pressure on the parties.
To deal with that question some further
reflection on mediation, "power mediation," and diplomacy is needed.
D. Mediation, "PowerMediation,"and Diplomacy
At first sight it might appear that the difference between these is to
be found in the range of activities that fall into Cell IV. 68 Certainly the
degree to which pressure is applied distinguishes "ordinary" mediation
from "power" mediation. Power mediation, usually practiced by nation
states, is synonymous with promising rewards or threatening
punishments, and it is often precisely for this ability that the mediating
state's offices are sought by one of the parties who hope that pressure
may be brought to bear on their opponent. Diplomacy (in the sense of
traditional, Track 1 diplomacy) may go even further into the business of
pressure, using ultimatums and sanctions in a way many mediators prefer
to avoid. But it seems to me that when people argue about mediation,
power mediation, and diplomacy, the difference among them is not just
about degree of pressure but lies at a deeper, even philosophical level;
there are two different sets of ontological assumptions at work, and those
who operate from one will often wonder if those who operate from the
other are not guilty of either political naivety or world-weary cynicism.

67.
68.

See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
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Listening to mediators debate these issues, it seems that people's
understandings of the origin of conflict divide on whether they regard it
as being ultimately driven by objective realities in which the interests of
parties are rootedor by the interests partiesperceive themselves to have,
interests which have always an interpretive, subjective, or socially
constructed nature. If the latter, there is some hope of resolution, or at
least management, of the conflict, by a range of changes in the
psychology and moral choices of the parties-to be brought about
notably by the efforts located in Cells I and 11.69 But if the former,
people are implicitly acknowledging the existence of an objective
conflict of interest. Even that is to some degree "bargainable," as when
two family members in dispute over the inheritance of land may be
helped to find some kind of integrative solution; but when there is an
underlying structure or system from which the conflict of interest
springs, the dispute is much more difficult, as when a law provides that
only males may inherit property. These kinds of "structure-oriented
disputes " 7° are particularly prevalent in international relations. The
dispute centers, for example, not on whether the colonized should be
ruled more justly but on why they are colonized at all; not on why one
ethnic group is in power at a point in time but why it is always in power.
The next question-and it is crucial for making progress with our
debate-is our view of how objectively real is the underlying structure or
system.
When an underlying structure is objectively real it operates
according to rules the bargainers are not free to reject. Those who
believe a nuclear arms race between two countries develops a dynamic of
its own, propelling the parties towards further acquisition of arms, or
those who believe acts of retaliation by one party generate a spiral of
violence, are alarmed precisely because they see a dynamic at work that
will produce escalation independently of the wishes of the people who
make the escalating decisions. 7 Their choices are already determined.
Game theorists arrive at a similar conclusion; where the structure of the
situation predisposes people to conflict, their individual psychology is to
some degree already determined (which is why, in the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game ("PDG"), it is so easy to demonstrate how rational
people get locked into choices that are in nobody's interest-and why the
PDG is classified as a "dangerous game").72 Some regard international
relations as a system that follows its own "laws." These "laws" may be
69.

See supra note 9 and accompanying table.

ANATOL RAPOPORT, CONFLICT IN MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT (1974).
LEWIS F. RICHARDSON, ARMS AND INSECURITY (1960).
72. ANDREW COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: THE STUDY OF
STRATEGIC INTERACTION (1982).
70.
71.
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expressed by heuristics such as, "If you wish for peace, prepare for war,"
or "Appeasement in the face of aggression only leads to more
aggression." More generally, those who believe in international relations
as a zero-sum power game, in which the interests of states are always
opposed to the interests of other states, also perceive an "objective"
system at work, in which the motivation of individual actors is more
effect than cause. In such a view, pushed to its conclusion, war is the
natural state between nations (because the "goods" are zero-sum), and
peace is to be explained, in the words of Clausewitz, as one of the parties
waiting for "a more favorable moment for action. 73 Rapoport puts it
starkly: "In summary, systemic theories of conflict cover an immense
range of conceptions and attitudes .... All of them, however, point to

the same conclusion: the 'psychology' of the system may be entirely
74
independent of the psychology of its human components."
This is bleak terrain indeed for those mediators whose natural
tendency is to believe in the possibility of personal change. But there
are, perhaps, few mediators of any persuasion who have not suffered
moments of despair in the face of apparently mindless violence
perpetrated by apparently sane people.
In a territory where warlords hold sway, or where ethnic cleansing
or genocide is in progress, the power "game" seems to be acted out
according to rules that cannot be ignored, one of the principal ones being
that might, if not always right, is indispensable to survival, and is
therefore the only reliable basis for dealing with disputes. One does not
have to be a devotee of Clausewitz to understand that the parties in such
conflicts will see few choices open to them, feeling compelled to military
or paramilitary action by the brutal reality of their circumstances.7 5 For
those who accept that reality and who wish to intervene in such a
conflict, the full range of possibilities in Cell IV is available, including
power mediation and peacekeeping military intervention. 76 Many
mediators would baulk at including other kinds of military action (e.g.,
peace-enforcement) as a form of mediation, although this may be more
arbitrary than we like to think. Where does that leave our view of
diplomacy? Perhaps the boundary where mediation stops and diplomacy
takes over is where the objective demands of the system are seen to be so
pressing that they eclipse, at least temporarily, the goal of changing the
parties' psychology. In that case, a change in behavior is felt to be so
urgent, and alternative approaches so devoid of results, that all kinds of
73.
74.

CARL VON

CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 111 (1968).
RAPOPORT, supra note 70, at 173.

75. This is not to deny the majesty of Gandhi's thought on non-violence, rather to
underscore the depth of the challenge it represents in such circumstances.
76. See supranote 9 and accompanying table.
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pressure, including military coercion, are seen as appropriate, and even
necessary. This is not to say that diplomats are strangers to the range of
mediation efforts associated with Cells I and I1, but perhaps that they
perceive a complex system in operation with both human and systemic
components.

77

Perhaps for diplomats, however much one may argue that

the laws of the system are ultimately derived from parties' subjective
appreciation of goals and interests, those laws appear as a reality of

unyielding hardness, which it is their professional duty to address.
But systemic determinism has not gone unchallenged.

Some

scholars rebel against the idea of a "psychology" of the system, not only
out of repugnance at the thought that human beings are the playthings of
their environment but also on the theoretical ground that social systems
78
For them,
are ultimately directed by the actions of individual humans.
systems are ultimately given power by humans (no matter how much

they have been trained to give programmed responses that are connected

to their role) and it is therefore with humans and their psychology that
79
conflict managing must start.

Mediators who follow this line will

confine their efforts primarily to Cells I and II; if they venture into Cells
III and IV, it will be with clear ideas of how far they are prepared to go
80
Their position, as we noted above,
in applying pressure on the parties.
their apparent hardness, remain
despite
structures,
reflects a view that
ultimately social constructions, and these can be addressed by challenges

77. Fred E. Emery & Eric L. Trist, Socio-Technical Systems, in SYSTEMS THINKING:
SELECTED READINGS (Fred E. Emery ed., 1969). Emery and Trist articulated the notion
of a socio-technical system as the best way of understanding human behavior in
organizations. Id. They conceptualized the output of an industrial system (its quantity or
quality of product, rate of absenteeism, accidents, etc.) as resulting from two subsystems,
one social/psychological, the other technical/economic. Id. These subsystems operate
according to different "laws," which may come into conflict with each other: for
example, economies of scale imply assembly-line methods of production which are likely
to lead to worker alienation, absenteeism, and poor quality. Id. Emery and Trist put
forward the Principle of Joint Optimization, whereby any attempt to optimize either
subsystem at the expense or neglect of the other will necessarily result in suboptimization of the system as a whole. Id. It is intriguing to speculate that similar ideas
could be applied to the subjective-objective problems of international relations-that any
attempt to optimize either the objective conflict of interests or the subjective experiences
of parties at the expense or neglect of the other will result in sub-optimization of the
system as a whole. See id. This suggestion may be consistent with the disenchantment
that has arisen with purely microeconomic approaches to bargaining and public policy.
Id; see also SCHON & REIN, supra note 18. The practical application of the sociotechnical idea is that it implies choice rather than determinism. For a discussion of how
the socio-technical tradition can be applied to understanding managerial responsibility for
safety, see Melvin Blumberg, Why Good Engineers Make Bad Decisions: Some
Implicationsfor ADR Professionals,108 PENN ST. L. REV. 137 (2003).
78. DAVID SILVERMAN, THE THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1970).
79. See id.
80. See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
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not just to the cognitive/emotional side of parties but to their moral
selves as well.
Does our quest for better understanding of international mediation
come down to this, that we must choose how far we believe conflict to be
determined by its own objective laws? Clearly this is a subset of a
question that in the Western intellectual tradition has been around since
the time of Plato. 81 Does it imply in our field an ontological fork in the
road, a point at which mediators must declare their colors, opting for the
subjective or the objective? In fact, considerable energy has been
expended in seeking to transcend this dilemma.
One approach is to develop systemic wisdom. In other words, by
becoming more aware of how our actions are influenced by the "laws" of
the system, we can seek to liberate ourselves from the automatic
responses they trigger. In the context of the learning organization, Senge
and his colleagues have done a great deal to bring home to practitioners
of management the need for developing awareness of the interrelatedness of things. 82 Just as the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
predisposes people to conflict by the sheer nature of its strategic
structure, or individual choices that appear rational and wealthmaximizing in structures, such as "The Tragedy of the Commons, 8 3
actually produce poverty for everybody, so in international affairs we
stumble into traps by failing to appreciate that we are dealing with a
system.
Once we begin to think of intergroup conflict as a system in which
feedback loops become self-reinforcing (even if this is unintended) 84 we
are less inclined to seek causes in the "badness and madness" of parties
and more inclined to search for other ways of helping them manage their
interdependence. In a similar vein, historians have sought explanations
for events such as the first World War, not so much in which nation was
to blame for starting it (because no nation actually wanted war), but in
the system of alliances and associated arms races that preceded it. This
is not to deny human responsibility but rather to understand more deeply
how, through unintended consequence and circular causality, actions that
appear rational lead to devastating results.
81.

And perhaps it is even longer in Eastern traditions.

82. PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE
LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1990).

83. R. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968); see
Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169 (1980).
84. Magorah Maruyama, The Second Cybernetics: Deviation Amplifying Mutual
Causal Processes, 51 AM. SCIENTIST 164, 179 (1963); see Magorah Maruyama,
Mindscapes,Management, Business Policy, and Public Policy, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 612
(1982); Leo F. Smyth, Identity-Based Conflicts: A Systemic Approach, 18 NEGOT. J. 147
(2002).
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The questioning by biologists of our common-sense distinction
between organization and environment 85 is paralleled by an increasing
realization in conflict studies that all parties contribute to the problems in
which they are immersed. 6 An awareness of this joint contribution can
be the beginning of conflict resolving.
The fragility of human perception as a reliable presenter of the
reality "out there" has been known for centuries; among other things, we
know that our perception actively creates our image of the "objective"
stimulus. More recently, the fragility of thought has been similarly
explicated,87 showing that it too is actively involved in creating an image
that we all too readily assume is the reality "out there." The physicist
David Bohm developed a theory of thought itself as a system; one in
which emotion plays as big a part as intellect and past thoughts leap
reflex-like to conclusions about present stimuli, masking our contribution
to what we take to be problems generated by others. 88 Furthermore,
Bohm posits that instead of thought being something practiced by
individuals and then communicated to others, it works the other way
round. 89 Thought is fundamentally a collective phenomenon where the
flow of meaning between people is of crucial importance, a view90 that
practice.
presents a major challenge, and opportunity, for mediation
All these ideas point in the same direction-that the way we think
about conflict may be part of the problem. That needs serious reflection
on the part of both mediators and their clients, suggesting more effort not
only in conflict assessment but also in examination of the unawared
91
Does that mean that
assumptions we use in making those assessments.
all our efforts should go into Cells I and 1I? No, because having
eventually understood how our thinking has contributed to our
conflicting interests, we must still find a way of handling those interests;
we cannot live in a world without structures, laws, and agreements.
Worldviews generate practices, interests, goals, and symbols. Just as
"things that are perceived as true are true in their consequences," so these
practices, interests, goals, and symbols are real or, as Agnew put it:
& FRANCISCO J. VARELA, AUTOPOIESIS AND
85. HUMBERTO R. MATURANA
COGNITION: THE REALIZATION OF THE LIVING (1980); Humberto R. Maturana, Reality:

The Search for Objectivity or the Quest for a Compelling Argument, 9 IRISH J. OF
PSYCHOL. 25, 82 (1988).
86. DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS (1999); see SCHON & REIN,
supra note 18.
87.

KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995).

88.
89.

DAVID BOHM, THOUGHT AS A SYSTEM (1994).

Id.
See id
William Pemberton, The Dynamics and Prevention of Human Self-Destruct: The
Application of Therapeutic Intervention, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION TECHNOLOGY (Donald
90.
91.

W. Cole ed., 1983).
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"[O]nly by changing the conditions that create intractability (practices,
interests, stakes, goals, etc.) in a specific case can an intractable conflict
be resolved., 92 Thus, pointing out to India and Pakistan that their
nuclear arms race has a dangerous systemic structure that is similar to the
Prisoner's Dilemma Game is certainly a reasonable mediation tactic; but
beyond that, elaborating a structure for the governance of Kashmir (the
crucial disputed interest) is essential to managing the conflict. While we
may search for the ultimate meaning of structures in human psychology,
we also need to create institutions that regulate those dynamics.
Institutions are the bridge between the subjective worldview of the
parties and the management of their interdependence. This focus on
institutions brings us to a consideration of the perennial lesson of
Gettysburg.
E. Gettysburg
Reflecting on those "structure-oriented conflicts," we discussed
above (colonialism, access to political power for some groups rather than
others, eligibility to inherit resources, etc.), it can be seen that they
revolve around institutions that regulate power between the parties. It is
the business of constitutions in the first instance to do that, and the
effectiveness of a constitution can be judged by the extent to which it is
perceived as a power-equal device for handling deeply felt differences
between the individuals and groups it governs. To achieve that, ideas
such as equality before the law, separation of executive and judiciary
powers, etc. are installed, deliberately binding the more powerful
sections of the society to constitutionally acceptable means. Because it
strives to be based on equality rather than power, a belief can be widely
shared that the constitution (written or unwritten) is the ultimate conflictresolving device. Occasionally, however, where differences are very
deeply felt, the belief breaks down as the constitution itself becomes
defined as part of the problem. The result is a danger of revolution or
secession. This is particularly likely to happen where a group of people
feels that their identity is threatened by the constrictions of the
constitutional form.
A crucial point seems to be the extent to which people's identities
can be made more complex, nested within larger identities. The
92. John Agnew, Beyond Reason: Spatial and Temporal Sources of Ethnic Conflicts,
in INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 41 (Louis Kriesberg et al. eds.,

1989). Agnew goes on to express his understanding with admirable clarity: "This is not
to say that intractability is the product of a set of objective conditions, which somehow
exist 'apart' from the parties. Rather it is my position that intractability is socially
constructed by the parties as they objectify their conflict in terms of interests, stakes, and
goals." Id. at 41-42.
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improvement in relationships between pro and anti-abortionists
mentioned earlier under Cell II is a perfectly sensible goal,93 but exists in
the context of a larger identity ("we are all American citizens") where
both sides tacitly accept the existence of the United States Constitution
and laws. Within that context, each side can respect the sincerity of their
fellow Americans while working through constitutionally acceptable
means to frustrate their goals. But the danger of group identities that are
not nested within a larger identity is that, frustrated by the inability to
make progress, or overcome by the perceived attack on cherished values,
parties will define the regulating institution as part of the problem. The
conflict then becomes defined not as about an issue (e.g., abortion) but
about the structure of the system.
The same dynamic that gave rise to the Battle of Gettysburg
remains a huge challenge in many parts of the world today. This is
especially true for post-colonial or post-communist regimes where
different group identities are expected to develop nation-building
constitutions in a territory whose boundaries owe more to the
convenience of conquest than to any shared culture or historical tradition
from which a larger identity might spring.
The same considerations can be applied to supra-national
institutions. Just as institutions that build nations need to be able to
transcend local identities, whether ethnic, religious, or cultural, so supranational institutions like the United Nations need to be able to transcend
national identities. Such institutions also aspire to power-equalization
among their disparate members, deliberately binding the more powerful;
they have a belief in a common humanity as the ultimate identity, and are
dedicated to managing differences, even passionately held ones, in
institutionally acceptable ways. Unfortunately, they are also subject to
conflicts moving from being issue-oriented to being structure-oriented.
Thus, the question posed by Lincoln at Gettysburg remains relevant for
them too: whether any institution "so conceived and so dedicated can
94
long endure."
VI.

In Summary: Capitulation to the Routine in International Mediation

As mentioned at the outset, international mediation does not suffer
from the kind of routine that affects mediation efforts in other fields.
However, the same concern that gave rise to the Symposium can be
observed also in this domain, namely a temptation to derogate from the
highest ideals of mediation. Having reflected on the debate surrounding
international mediation, are we any closer to identifying what those
93.
94.

See supra note 9 and accompanying table; infra Part IV.B.
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temptations are? And what might be the corresponding challenges?
A.

Remaining Open to the Complexity of InternationalRelations

Listening to debates among mediators, one occasionally detects a
tendency to either-or conceptualizations. Someone who describes a
conflict in terms of the strategic interests of the parties tends to be
skeptical of mediation efforts based on education, persuasion, and
improving communications, which they see as naYve, and not "where it's
at." In the terms developed here, once they see aspects of a conflict in
Cell IV, they see no role for Cells I and II. 95 On the other hand, someone
who describes a conflict in terms of socially constructed categories is
often reluctant to accept the dynamics of those categories as real, for fear
of getting sucked into analyses and actions that are not "where it's at."
In this essay, we have, for the purposes of attaining clarity, separated
positions such as these into distinct cells. But in practice, the way we
think produces objectified realities with which we have to deal,96 while
our experience of these objectified realities profoundly influences the
way we think.97 Mediation efforts must reflect that complex, circular
reality. That is the first challenge and it implies that we should be wary
of capitulating either to a subjectivist or objectivist stance. The next
challenge is related: how to hold the tension between strategies designed
to bring about personal change and those designed to pressure change in
behavior.
B.

Holding the Tension

In Two Strategies of Social Change and Their Dilemmas, Walton
describes the tactics of the power strategy:
First, in order to establish a basis for negotiation with the other and
improve the probable outcome for itself, a group must build its power
vis-6-vis the other ... . To command attention and establish a basis
for a quid pro quo, they must threaten the other with harm, loss,
inconvenience, or embarrassment .... These tactics create a basis for
negotiation only if the threats are credible. One important technique
for increasing their credibility
is to fulfill a given threat once or
98
repeatedly, as required.
By contrast, what Walton calls the attitude change strategy requires:
increasing the level of trust between parties; refraining from any actions
95.

See supra note 9 and accompanying table.
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that might harm members of the rival group; minimizing their perception
of potential threat; and attempting to achieve a high degree of empathy
with their motives, aspirations, and attitudes. 99 Leaving aside for the
moment the question of violence, what is the international mediator to
do, understanding that both these strategies have their advantages and
disadvantages with respect to achieving an agreed outcome? And
understanding further that both strategies may be pursued by parties
sequentially, or even simultaneously? In effect, this is a challenge to the
mediator to hold the tension between Cell II activities and those of Cell
IV. 0 0 The temptation is to disbelieve in the genuineness of attitude
change overtures that come from groups hitherto (or currently) engaged
in the power strategy. Or, the reverse temptation: to be utterly devastated
when a group that has been engaging in dialogue decides to exercise its
negotiating muscle. Yet, both of these strategies are legitimate and both
may be necessary. Just as there are contingencies that govern the
interventions of mediators, so there are times and seasons when different
strategies are appropriate for the parties.
Unquestionably, holding this tension between different strategies is
particularly challenging where a group has resorted to violence and may
do so again. This can be illustrated by Senator George Mitchell's
handling of the decommissioning crisis in the Northern Ireland talks. 10 '
The IRA had been on cease-fire for over a year. 10 2 From their
perspective, this pause in a legitimate armed struggle was to give peace
negotiations a chance, and they had expected that talks would have
begun shortly after their cease-fire was announced. 10 3 Other parties felt
that negotiations could not start on future democratic government until
all those at the table had definitively signed up to democracy. 0 4 For
them, this meant decommissioning-the handing over of weapons-on
the grounds that they would not negotiate with a party that was, in effect,
holding a gun to their head, ready to return to violence if the negotiation
outcomes were not to their liking.10 5 To the Republican side, the call for
decommissioning looked like a call for surrender, a demand that the rank
and file in the movement would not tolerate, especially because it was
widely accepted that they had not been, and could not be, defeated
militarily. 10 6 Cease-fires without decommissioning had strong historical
99. Id.
100.
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precedents, with the legitimacy of both governments in Ireland being
cradled in negotiations during such cease-fires.
In this standoff, the challenge for mediation was, first of all, to
avoid trying to negotiate the dispute in the terms in which it was
presented (e.g., how many bullets handed over would be enough?). Such
an approach could never have done justice to the symbolic values
involved. Second, and even more fundamental, was the challenge to
hold the tension between understanding the objectivist, power strategy of
Cell IV-the likelihood that the continued absence of talks would cause
a return to violence-and Mitchell's absolute belief in democratic
methods of conflict resolution. 0 7 To speak about the power strategy was
to risk accusations of being a fellow traveler of terrorists, with inside
knowledge of their timetable; but to fail to articulate the risk of a return
to violence, which Mitchell saw as likely simply on the basis of common
sense, would have been to rob participants of the full reality of the
gravity of their situation. In the event, even as Mitchell and his comediators worked to produce a third alternative, a set of principles that
all the parties would be required to sign as an entry ticket to negotiations,
the danger he had warned about took place, with a massive bomb being
detonated in Central London. 10 8 In Mitchell's words:
Because of my remarks on the Frost show a few days earlier, I was
deluged by requests for comment. Reporters asked over and over
again how I had "known" that the IRA was going to end its ceasefire. The more I denied any inside knowledge, the more certain they
were that
I had such knowledge. They simply wouldn't accept the
09
truth.'
To understand is not necessarily to condone. To hold the tension
between understanding the "laws" of the system, while maintaining faith
in the ability of people to change, is a true challenge for mediators.
C. Develop Choices
The idea of developing options and choices is certainly not confined
to international mediation. But as relations between nations reach crisis
point, a momentum builds that has an implacable quality.
Communication becomes less complex as the clamor for action
increases. Neither party can see much in the way of alternatives. In that
context, the supreme task of the international mediator is to create
choices where none seem to exist. It is hard to over-state the difficulty
107.
108.
109.
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that entails. To attempt to stop a nation preparing for war is a task to
daunt all but the most courageous. Many of us capitulate to the feeling
that after a certain point the preparations are unstoppable, although some
mediators have risen to the challenge. It may be consoling to take a leaf
out of the book of systems thinkers, in particular the image of the trim
tab. The trim tab is used to illustrate the idea that "small, well-focused
actions can sometimes produce significant, enduring improvements, if
they're in the right place."' 10 A trim tab is a small rudder on the main
rudder of a ship."' Where the ship is large and traveling at some speed,
a huge force must be applied to the main rudder in order to get the ship to
turn. 112 But by turning the trim tab (a relatively tiny piece of metal) in
and
the opposite direction, forces are set up that allow the main rudder,
13
ease.'
greater
far
with
turned
be
to
itself,
consequently the ship
This image conveys both a hope and a challenge for mediators. The
hope is that even individual efforts may be effective in influencing the
actions of states; the challenge is to find the point of leverage where the
effort will be effective. It is perhaps not simply a question of creativity.
Faith is also needed-faith in the ability of human kind to shape its
destiny. Holding that faith may be a defining ideal of international
mediation. Mitchell expressed it thus: "Conflicts are created and
sustained by human beings; they can be ended by human beings, no
no matter how much damage
matter how ancient, no matter how hurtful,
' 14
has been done, conflict can be ended." "
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